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INTRODUCTION 
In its responsive briefing, the State engages in minimal analysis of Mr. Starer's sentence. 
Rather, the State primarily and simply recites the "abuse of discretion" standard of review 
undisputedly applicable to this appeal and concludes that no abuse of discretion occurred. The 
State in effect treats the abuse of discretion standard as being impossible to overcome. The 
State's argument fails, however, because the abuse of discretion standard is rendered moot if it 
functions only as a "rubber stamp" of the district court's sentencing decisions. Afforded 
discretion may, however, still be abused, and such discretion afforded the district court was 
abused in Mr. Storer' s case. 
ARGUMENT 
A district court is afforded wide, but not unfettered, discretion at sentencing. A sentence 
is unreasonable if it is excessive under the facts of the case and in consideration of the four 
objectives of sentencing: the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 146, 814 P.2d 401,406 (1991); see also State v. Toohill, 103 
Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
At the heart of this appeal lies the question of whether the "abuse of discretion" standard 
of review constitutes a meaningful standard which, though difficult to overcome, is utilized in 
limited and appropriate cases to overturn unreasonable and excessive sentences such as that 
imposed by the district court on Mr. Storer. Or, is the "abuse of discretion" standard of review, in 
cases of sentences within statutory maximums, in practice nothing more than a rubber stamp, a 
hurdle which no criminal defendant may defeat. 
The State clearly counsels the latter approach. First, the State wholly ignores the fact that 
of the two defendants comparable to Mr. Storer, Mr. Storer received by far the harshest sentence. 
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Those two comparable defendants received only probation and a rider; neither was sentenced to a 
term of incarceration. Thus, based on this comparison alone, it is evident that Mr. Storer is a 
sentencing outlier, immediately raising abuse of discretion concerns. (Confidential Exhibit 
Presentence Report ("PSR"), Report of Andrea Fielder ("Fielder Rep."), 14.) 
Next, the State summarily notes, with no discussion, the highly significant fact that the 
district court did not consider a rider for Mr. Storer because Mr. Storer performed too well on his 
pretrial release: "The district court rejected retained jurisdiction as appropriate in this case ... The 
district court's determination that it did not need additional information regarding Starer's 
rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation was an eminently reasonable reason to reject 
retaining jurisdiction." (Resp 'ts.' Br., 4, 7.) 
The State provides no substantive analysis or justification regarding the reasonability of 
incarcerating Mr. Storer when he did so well on pretrial release as to render a rider moot. As 
noted by the State, the primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial 
court to obtain additional information regarding the defendant's rehabilitative potential and 
suitability for probation. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984); Toohill, 
103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709. There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court's refusal to 
retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to conclude that the 
defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P.2d 
673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567,650 P.2d at 709. 
Most significantly, it is axiomatic that "probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant 
who is on retained jurisdiction." State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673,677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 
2005). See also Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709 (Ct. App. 1982) ("In any event, 
probation is the ultimate objective sought by defendants who ask a court to retain jurisdiction.") 
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Given that the unequivocal goal of a rider is to assist a defendant in obtaining probation, 
it cannot be argued that a rider is an intermediate penal step between incarceration and probation. 
A defendant who fails on a rider may expect incarceration, while one who succeeds may expect 
probation. A rider is akin to a math placement test; score well and the student is placed in 
calculus, while a poor score calls for placement in remedial algebra. 
In this case the district court undisputedly declined to place Mr. Storer on a rider because 
he did exceedingly well on pretrial release: 
I pretty quickly decided that a rider was not necessary or really even appropriate in this 
case. Often times that's to give people a four, six, eight month stab at getting started in 
rehab and then you hope with probation terms they can continue. It seems to me that you 
already got a good start at the rehab and I just don't think that a rider was necessary. 
(Tr., p. 47, L. 6-13.) The district court, having concluded that Mr. Storer had already "passed" a 
rider, or made so much progress that a rider was unnecessariiy superfluous, iogicaliy should have 
placed Mr. Storer on probation because "probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is 
on retained jurisdiction." Jones, 141 Idaho at 677, 115 P.3d at 768. 
And therein lies the heart of the district court's abuse of discretion. Mr. Storer was so 
successful on pretrial release that he was given a pass by the district court with regards to the 
intermediate sanction of a rider. Instead of letting Mr. Storer then attempt the less harsh sanction 
of probation, the district court abused its discretion by imposing the harshest sanction and 
incarcerating Mr. Storer. Functionally, this was the analog of the district court sending Mr. Storer 
on a rider, Mr. Storer completing the rider as successfully as conceivably possible, and then the 
district court nonetheless imposing a term of incarceration in reward therefor. Returning to our 
mathematics example, Mr. Storer aced the placement test, flying colors, but was nonetheless 
punished by being placed in a remedial class. 
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The State cites the premise that "[t]he district court's determination that it did not need 
additional information regarding Storer's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation was 
an eminently reasonable reason to reject retaining jurisdiction." (Resp 'ts.' Br., 7.) This reasoning, 
however, is nonsensical. If the goal of a rider is probation, then by not giving Mr. Storer a chance 
on a rider, the district court had determined that Mr. Storer's was such an egregious case that, no 
matter how Mr. Storer performed on his rider, the district court was going to incarcerate Mr. 
Storer and not permit him to attempt probation. Bear in mind that Mr. Starer's two most similar 
defendants received probation and a rider. Thus, the district court, although effusively praising 
Mr. Starer's pretrial efforts, had already decided to sentence him more harshly than any 
previously comparable defendants in the State of Idaho. 
As the district court only ruled out a rider due to Mr. Storer's exemplary pretrial 
performance, it is safe to presume that had Mr. Storer performed more poorly on pretrial release, 
the district court would have afforded him a chance at a rider. In effect, the district court 
perversely incentivized Mr. Storer to perform more poorly on pretrial release so as to be afforded 
a chance at a rider, a less harsh sanction than incarceration. Mr. Storer was punished for his 
successful rehabilitation efforts, and such unreasonable and unjustified punishment constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
Lastly, the State correctly notes that the pretrial recommendations are not binding upon a 
district court. (Resp 'ts.' Br., 5.) The State misunderstands Mr. Starer's arguments and the 
applicable standards of review. Mr. Storer does not contend that the numerous recommendations 
of probation were binding upon the district court, but rather that the district court's unreasonable 
and unjustified disavowal thereof constituted an abuse of its discretion. By simply noting that 
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pretrial recommendations are not binding, the State advocates the "rubber stamp" approach to 
affirming sentences falling within statutory maximums. 
By taking this position, the State must necessarily agree that if twenty-seven nationally 
renowned experts from all jurisdictions and backgrounds recommended a sentence of probation 
for Mr. Storer, but the district court nonetheless chose to impose the statutory maximum ten 
years' incarceration, such sentence would represent, by definition, a proper exercise of the 
district court's discretion. In effect, the State is taking the position that if a district court 
sentences within statutory maximums, then the sentence imposed must be rubber stamped and 
the abuse of discretion standard of review is a nullity, a legal fiction. The State's counseled 
approach would render appeals of sentences within statutory maximums wholly moot. 
Such appeals are not moot, however, and there exist sentences that, despite falling within 
the bounds of statutory maximums, constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing 
court. "[W]hen this court has found that there has been an abuse of discretion in sentencing, it 
has not hesitated to exercise its power to review in that regard to reduce the sentences imposed." 
State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 4,539 P.2d 553,556 (1975). See also State v. Nell, 13 Idaho 539, 90 
P. 860 (1907) (Supreme Court held that a ten-year sentence for assault to commit rape was 
excessive, and remanded the case for imposition of a two-year sentence); State v. Linebarger, 71 
Idaho 255,232 P.2d 669 (1951) (Supreme Court found there were no aggravating circumstances 
and held imposition of a twenty-year sentence under the facts there to be an abuse of discretion 
and reduced the sentence to not exceed five years); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97 
(1954) (Supreme Court held the maximum term of imprisonment and fine for involuntary 
manslaughter was excessive, finding an abuse of discretion in imposing the fine, which was 
remitted); State v. Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451, 364 P.2d 171 (1961) (Supreme Court in a case 
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involving lewd and lascivious conduct with a 14 year old girl held a thirty-year sentence to be 
extreme and reduced it to fifteen years). Such is the case here, as the district court abused its 
discretion in sentencing Mr. Storer to a term of incarceration despite crediting Mr. Storer for 
successful completion of a rider based on his exemplary performance on pretrial release. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, none of the State's arguments set forth in its responsive 
briefing are availing. Mr. Storer's appeal is appropriately granted and the case remanded. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of July, 2017. 
MATTHEW G. GUNN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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